

THE CONTRACTION AND EXPANSION OF THE "UMAT" AND THE ROLE OF THE NAHDATUL ULAMA IN INDONESIA

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One of the most powerful concepts in Islam is that of the *umat* (Arabic *umma*), the universal community of the faithful to which every Muslim belongs. The *haj* is probably the single most important means of making that concept a concrete reality, but except for the *haj* few Muslims experience the universality of the *umat* directly. For most, there is a narrower, more relevant community that helps define an individual's identity as a Muslim. This point was brought home forcefully in a recent article by Abdurrahman Wahid on the changes in meaning that Arabic loan words have undergone in Indonesian.¹ Thus *tarbiah*, which in Arabic means training or education in the broadest sense, has come to have the very specific meaning of Islamic education as taught in an institution. Likewise, Wahid asserts, *umat* has come for all practical purposes to mean the membership of the particular Muslim social, educational, or political organization to which an Indonesian Muslim belongs. In fact, it is not the definition of the word which has changed, but the nature of the community through which an Indonesian experiences his or her own membership in the *umat*. Looking at how the community, the relevant *umat* if you will, has changed over time for the Javanese, suggests that what has come to be called an Islamic resurgence may be simply the widening of the community most directly relevant to Muslim self-identity. It also suggests that beyond signifying the stifling of political participation the decline of Islamic political parties in Indonesia has implications for fundamental questions of Islamic identity.

Two factors affect the scope of the relevant Muslim community (hereafter referred to as "*umat*," the use of quotation marks indicating that this is a contrived use of the term and is to be distinguished from the universal community). One factor is the local political and economic environment in which the "*umat*" exists, the second, the international Islamic environment to which it relates. To some extent, the more the global *umat* approaches political reality, the more outward looking the local "*umat*" will be.

Umma in Arabic means "nation" or "people." Since the early days of Islam, then, it has had a political connotation, for it embraced all those who accepted the Will of God as expressed in the *shari'a* or Islamic law and thus gave rise to the need for institutions to enforce that law. The Will of God could only be implemented through a political order.² While religious and secular authority in the Islamic world diverged soon after Mohammed's death, the existence of the umma as a political community remained a necessary and powerful fiction,

1. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Kata Sama, Arti Berbeda," *Tempo*, August 20, 1983.

2. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 3.

because it was only in the umma that ultimate truth resided. As the Prophet was reported to have said, "My community shall never agree on an error."³

If infallibility and universality together accounted in part for the endurance and strength of the concept of the umat, another factor was the concrete reality of Mecca. There was of course the haj, the annual reaffirmation of community, and the duty of every Muslim who could afford it to make the pilgrimage to Mecca gave that city an important role in perpetuating a belief in the physical reality of a global umat. But the fact that, until the surrender of Sherif Hussein to Ibn Saud in 1925, Mecca had always enjoyed special political status under a succession of Arabic, Persian, and Turkic dynasties meant that in a very real sense, there was a capital city for the umat with a ruler, the Sherif, who could receive delegations from other states. More important, perhaps, Mecca housed the religious scholars who acted as ultimate arbiters of differences within the umat and who could confer legitimacy on any Muslim ruler or withdraw it from him. The *ulama* in Mecca were no less guilty of political intrigue than was the Pope in medieval Europe, and the Ottomans, among many others, were past masters at securing favorable *fatwa*.⁴ But whatever the foibles of individual scholars, the possibility of an appeal to Mecca for such a *fatwa* gave credence to the idea of a religio-political authority that transcended the authority of individual Muslim rulers. That authority could be assumed only in the absence of competing political ideologies, and, with the onset of colonialism and nationalism throughout the Islamic world on the one hand, and the end of the Sherifian dynasty and the incorporation of Mecca into the new nation-state of Saudi Arabia on the other, the relation of local Muslim communities to the broader umat would necessarily undergo change.

If changes in the "capital" of the Muslim world affect the scope of the "umat," so too do local political and economic conditions. At the most basic level, relations with the broader Muslim world depend on whether the political unit within which that community lives is Muslim or non-Muslim and, if the latter, whether hostile or sympathetic to Islamic activities and associations. It depends on whether the members of that "umat" define themselves primarily in terms of religion, ethnic group, or nation. It depends on the nature of exchange between the "umat" and the rest of the Muslim world—whether this is primarily economic, religious, or cultural, taking the form of trade, the haj, or mass communications. And it depends on the ability to communicate in a commonly understood language.

With local and international factors in mind, we can look at the evolution of the Javanese "umat." In the following pages, I will briefly examine how these factors may have shaped that "umat" at selected points in history, and how the realignment of the "umat" today is affecting one organization, the Nahdatul Ulama.

3. Ibid., p. 78.

4. In 1726, the Ottomans received a *fatwa* allowing them to help fight off an Afghan invasion of Persia, despite the fact that the Afghans, like the Ottomans, were Sunni and the Persians, heretical Shi'a. The *fatwa* was based on the fact that since the Afghan leader had declared himself "Caliph of the East" there was the danger of the split Caliphate and a threat to the dignity of Islam. Edward G. Brown, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924), p. 130.

The Seventeenth Century to the Present

In the seventeenth century, the "umat" for the pious Muslim from Java was the entire Islamic world, a fact made possible by trade and the use of Arabic as a lingua franca in the Indian ocean. In the early part of the century, through trade the coastal states on the major islands of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi were well integrated into the Islamic world. There is a long-standing debate as to whether Arabs, Chinese, Gujeratis, or Bengalis first brought Islam to the islands but, as Anthony Johns has noted, the important point is that any of them could have. All mixed with Malay sailors in the ports of the Indian Ocean, which had all the characteristics of "an Arabic-speaking Mediterranean."⁵ Muslim scholars from Aceh studied in Mecca, Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere with sheikhs from the subcontinent and the Maghreb, and major theological debates over Sufism and the relationship between man and Allah were reflected not only in writings of indigenous Muslims but in texts written by renowned Muslim scholars in Mecca for their "Jawi"—that is, Malay-speaking—students.

At the same time, Islam was incorporated into the existing political structure without much disruption of traditional practices, in part because it reached the islands peacefully, through trade, and conversion of local rulers seems to have been for the most part voluntary. In western Sumatra, among the Minangkabau, religious leaders had their own niche in the traditional hierarchy, the mosque stood side by side with the tribal council hall, and legend had it that the Minangkabau world was ruled by three kings: King of Adat, King of Religion (that is Islam), and King of the World.⁶ Aceh was already well established as a Muslim state by the time Iskandar Muda ascended to power, and, under Iskandar, it established diplomatic relations with the holy city of Mecca and with the two major Muslim powers of the era, the Ottoman and Mughal Empires.⁷ Java was somewhat more problematical, because Islam's place in the great seventeenth-century state of Mataram was variously defined in opposition to the Christian colonial powers, to the heavily Islamicized north coast cities, and to the Hindu-Buddhist states to the east. It was clear, however, that, even in the agrarian interior of Central Java where the Mataram court lay, Islam was a necessary component of kingship, and Sultan Agung saw himself as a Muslim ruler. Not only did he declare a *jihad* against Bali and the easternmost part of Java which had not yet converted to Islam,⁸ but, more telling perhaps, he sent an ambassador to Mecca to legitimize his claim to the title of Sultan. In doing so, he allowed himself to become caught up in the Anglo-Dutch rivalry for influence over Eastern trade, because it was the English, undoubtedly hoping to strengthen an indigenous ruler against the Dutch, who provided the ships in which the Sultan's envoys made their

5. Anthony Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New Directions," *Indonesia* 19 (April 1975): 39.

6. Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).

7. Anthony Johns, "Islam in the Malay World," in *Islam in Asia*, ed. Johns (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 121.

8. D. G. E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 314.

journey.⁹ But apart from playing into the hands of a colonial power, the Sultan's move did serve to acknowledge the existence of a bond between Java and the Islamic heartland which was based on a common religion but which had wider cultural and political implications. To quote Johns, "the Islamic tradition represented the world of intellectual life and culture outside of Java; and Arabic was as well-known by those who participated in this world as Dutch was among their equivalents two centuries later."¹⁰ It was therefore only natural that, after being exposed to the strength of the European powers, the Sultan would seek to strengthen his own hand by formally requesting an Islamic title not from the Ottoman Sultan, but from the ruler of Mecca.

Compared with the seventeenth century, the "umat" for Javanese Muslims at the end of the nineteenth century has become much narrower. Javanese Muslims no longer define themselves as Muslims in relation to Islamic culture writ large, but in relation to those who speak Malay--the community known in Mecca as the Jawah. One important factor in this change is that, with control of Indian Ocean trade passing from Arabs and Arabic-speakers to Europeans, Arabic was transformed into a purely religious language for most Javanese, and their interaction with other Muslims, even in Mecca, was largely restricted to those who spoke Malay.

In some ways the Mecca phenomenon was ironic, because it was precisely the increase in the numbers of people from the Indies making the pilgrimage that led to a contraction of the relevant "umat," even within the holy city itself. The fluent Arabic speakers, the longtime residents, and the well-established *imam* of Malay and Indies origin found themselves interacting increasingly with fellow-Malay speakers. The reason was not just that there were more Malays to speak to, thanks to improvements in transportation that made the journey to Mecca safer, shorter, and perhaps less costly. It was also because of the employment opportunities that the increased numbers made possible, such as guiding pilgrims, lodging and feeding them, and teaching those who wished to prolong their stay beyond the pilgrimage season. For all of these tasks, a knowledge of Malay was essential. The economic links binding Malay speakers to one another operated not only within Mecca, but between Mecca and the Indies as well. There was a good market in the archipelago for products from the Middle East, and one of the most important of these was books.

This phenomenon [the reliance of the Indies Muslims on "spiritual nourishment" from Mecca] can be discerned in the hand-books used in teaching in Moslim schools in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo. The latest literary publications in Mekka soon drive out the teaching material brought formerly from Mekka, and among the merchandise exported out of Mekka which finds a ready market, figure above all, printed books, the authors of which are either Jâwah settled in Mekka or Mekkan professors specially esteemed by Jâwah.¹¹

9. H. J. DeGraaf, "Southeast Asian Islam in the Eighteenth Century," *Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 149.

10. Johns, "Islam in Southeast Asia," p. 48.

11. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Half of the 19th Century* (Leyden: Brill, 1931), p. 258.

If in the "capital" of the Islamic world, the "umat" for the Javanese had come to be defined primarily in terms of language and place of origin, the same was true on Java, but for very different reasons. For one thing, the "umat" on Java no longer embraced the political elite. The Dutch colonial state had given an administrative unity to the islands that once composed a host of individual states and sultanates, and political and Islamic authority were now completely separate; the Dutch governor-general did not need to send an emissary to Mecca to legitimate his position. The Dutch refusal to accord Islam even a symbolic place in the colonial government was reflected in the deterioration of relations between the religious elite and the indigenous Javanese political elite through whom the Dutch ruled. Fear of organized Islam made colonial authorities unwilling to give even the symbols of traditional power to aristocrats or *priyayi* with strongly Muslim sympathies. A kind of selection process was thus at work. The religious elite, for its part, distrusted the association of the *priyayi* with the Christian authorities, but they themselves had no independent channel of communication to the Dutch.¹² The *priyayi*, as their political authority was sapped, devoted more and more of their time to the refinement of arts and language, developing the artificial, flowery, and excessively Sanskritized high-status *krama inggil* and turning to pre-Islamic themes for dance and drama.¹³ The gap between political and religious elites thus increased as neoclassical Javanese culture flourished. The gap was widened even further by the emergence of a competing school system to that of the traditional religious teachers, the *kyai*, in their rural *pesantren*. Until the appearance of Dutch schools designed to train some of the aristocracy for civil service careers, Javanese princes and sons of Muslim traders alike had been sent to *pesantren*, and if the education they received more resembled initiation into mystic secrets than instruction in Islamic legal principles, its authenticity as Islamic education was not questioned by either group. By drawing the *priyayi* sons out of the *pesantren*, the Dutch schools removed one important cultural link between *santri* and *priyayi*.

Developments in the Islamic world also served to separate the two. It may have been their consciousness of the broader *umat* and the fact that they no longer had ties to the political center on Java, that led Javanese Muslims to look toward Mecca, and to a lesser degree the Ottoman Empire as their center. Most Javanese may not have had a clear idea of where "Stamboul" was, but they knew it mattered, and the Jawah in Mecca followed the course of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 with interest as an example of the conflict between Christianity and Islam.¹⁴ Javanese identification with the Islamic side of the struggle undoubtedly fueled and was fueled by their dislike of the Dutch and their contempt for the Javanese aristocrats through whom the Dutch ruled.

In the differences that emerged in cultural orientation and education between the *priyayi* and the self-conscious Muslim in Java lie the beginnings of the distinction that exists to this day between "practicing" and "nominal" Muslims, with the political elite falling in the latter category. It is important to recall that this division, which has led those for whom Islam is the organizing principle of daily life to consider themselves a beleaguered and politically

12. Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite* (Singapore: Heinemann Books, 1982), p. 29.

13. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah" (unpublished paper, 1981).

14. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 260.

impotent minority amidst a majority of nominally Muslim *abangan*, is of relatively recent vintage. It was Dutch policy that effectively removed the local political elite from membership in the relevant "umat"; indeed, to a large extent, it was thanks to the Dutch that one could define oneself as a Muslim in opposition to the aristocracy and bureaucracy. There was nothing inherent in the culture of the Indies that made this outcome inevitable.

One more point is worth making here before taking another historical leap. It was in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries that Islamic reformist ideas from Cairo, inspired by the teachings of Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida began reaching the Indies. In reading accounts of Indonesian Islam, it often seems as though this reformism represented the first real intellectual development to reach the island from the Middle East. Nothing could be further from the truth. Virtually every major theological or doctrinal debate in the Islamic heartland had an effect on Islamic thinking and scholarship in the Indies through the Jawah who studied in Mecca. One reformist wave which had a profound impact particularly on Java, Sumatra, and the southern part of Kalimantan was the Naqshbandi reform movement which reached the Indies in the late nineteenth century and affected almost every Sufi *tarekat*.¹⁵ One of the reasons Abduh-inspired reformism became such a force in the islands was that the Dutch policy toward the *priyayi* prevented them from establishing a working relationship with it, as they had with earlier such waves. The *modus vivendi* of customary practice and Islam, of religious and secular authority, had been permanently altered.

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the "umat" for the Javanese became increasingly coterminous with the Dutch East Indies. If in Cairo or Mecca where many Southeast Asian Muslims studied, the important community was still one's fellow Malay speakers, in the Dutch East Indies it was one's fellow Indonesians. For a brief period, even the antagonism between religious and political elites was subsumed by opposition to the Christian Dutch. As the country's first mass-based nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam, demonstrated quite clearly, "native" and "Muslim" were synonymous, in the same way as were "Dutch" and "Christian" or even "Chinese" and "Confucian."

If the "umat" for the first time had geographic boundaries reflecting the extent of Dutch control, there were conflicting claims to represent that "umat" which were gradually institutionalized into organizations with branches throughout the Indies: Muhammadiyah, established in 1913 representing reformism; and the Nahdatul Ulama, set up thirteen years later, representing traditional orthodoxy.

The Muhammadiyah organization was founded by Kyai Achmad Dachlan, a religious official of the royal court in Yogyakarta, in part to provide modern schooling for children of relatively well-to-do Muslims who were not allowed to attend Dutch schools or those set up at the court. He had been to Cairo and was particularly taken with those aspects of reformist thinking which encouraged establishment of a modern educational system. The schools set up by Muhammadiyah were popular, particularly in urban areas, and spread rapidly--and with them, reformist ideology.

15. Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica* 44 (1976): 123-52.

Reformism, among other things, denied the validity of the principle of *taqlid*, in essence relying on recognized authority for interpretation of the Quran and *hadith*. The Javanese *kyai* were threatened, in part because the new schools competed with the *pesantren*, in part because a denial of *taqlid* denied the *kyai*'s own legitimacy as interpreter of the Shafi'ite *mazhab*, and in part because some traditional practices of the rural *kyai* were deemed illegal innovations by Muhammadiyah religious leaders. Fierce doctrinal debates raged for over a decade, exacerbated by the uncertainty of the fate of traditional religious shrines in Mecca and Medina under the new Saudi stewardship.

The concern caused in *kyai* circles by the Saudi takeover reflected apprehension not only over the puritanical bent of the Wahabi-influenced Saudis, but over a possible change in the role of Mecca vis-à-vis the "umat." The Sherifian dynasty had, after all, been an unbroken chain since the days of Mohammed and had enjoyed an autonomous vassal relationship with successive Islamic empires, most recently with the Ottomans. World War I threw the established Islamic order into a state of total confusion; first, the Sherif of Mecca cooperated with the infidel British against the Muslim Turks, and in the aftermath of the war, not only was the Sherif himself overthrown by Ibn Saud, an unknown quantity without the backing of empire, but the Kemalists in Turkey abolished the caliphate. As a result, the umat was probably less of a political reality than at any time since Mohammed. Saudi Arabia and Turkey were separate states, neither of which could make any pretense at domination of the Islamic world. The days of seeking political legitimacy from the rulers of Mecca were not quite over, as competition between Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama for the right to represent Indonesia at a world Islamic congress called by Ibn Saud in 1926 attested, but it soon became clear that the legitimacy of the leaders of the local "umat" would henceforth have to be established first within the local political setting.

At this stage, the following characteristics of the Javanese "umat" may be noted:

- It was increasingly extending beyond a narrow religious elite, thanks to increased literacy, publications available in the vernacular, improved transportation, and the focus on education of the two most prominent Muslim socioreligious organizations.

- Its membership was bounded by the borders of Dutch control. This was clear in the race of both Muhammadiyah and NU to open branch offices in every district of the country, and also in the fact that membership was limited, in fact if not by regulation, to Indonesian Muslims. No Thais or Malaysians were invited, a significant, if obvious, fact given the importance of the Jawah community.

- It had, at this stage, neither political power nor political aspirations; the center of the "umat" was still, symbolically, Mecca, though the role of Mecca in relation to local Muslim communities was permanently altered.

By the 1950s, the character of the "umat" had changed once more. The Japanese occupation and the years of revolution had muted the differences between the reformists and traditionalists. On Java the Japanese had drawn all Muslim organizations together into a federation called Masjumi and used Muslim leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah to try to mobilize grassroots support for the Japanese war effort. Prominent Muslims had been appointed to positions

of political prominence, and thus had been consciously set up as alternatives to the "secular nationalists," led by Sukarno. The Japanese also had given military training to Muslim leaders on Java and established a separate militia under Masjumi. During the revolution, both secular and religious nationalists had been fighting for the same objective, but the autonomous Muslim militias had made it possible to define oneself as a Muslim by fighting there, rather than in the regular army or one of the secular *lasykar*.

Two years after the declaration of independence in 1945, the fragile unity of the "umat" was initially shattered when the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) split off from the Masjumi. The attempt to preserve a single Muslim party and maintain the degree of cooperation that had existed during the occupation and early war years had thus broken down. In 1952 the NU also seceded to form its own independent party. By the mid-fifties there were different Muslim parties representing the interests of West Sumatra, West Java, East Java, and South Sulawesi and representing the ideological spectrum from Muslim "socialists" to Javanese traditionalists. The differences were highlighted by reactions to the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in February 1958 in Padang, West Sumatra, wherein a number of Masjumi members held leading positions. Although not exclusively religious in orientation, the PRRI government developed a distinctly Islamic cast. And the fact that a nationwide organization like the Nahdatul Ulama--in contrast to the Masjumi--made no effort to defend the PRRI, was an indication of how narrow the conception of "umat" had become.

But if regional and political differences had divided the Indonesian "umat," those differences were perpetuated by the fact that there has never been an Islamic institution that could preserve the unity of the "umat" in the absence of an external threat. The islands were never unified under a single Muslim ruler. There is no major Islamic urban center or seat of learning comparable to al-Azhar, Fez, or Aliqarh. There was never an Islamic bureaucratic hierarchy culminating in a single figure able to issue fatwa in the name of Islam (the Shafi'i Mufti in Mecca was flooded with requests for decisions from the Jawah throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); the Majelis Ulama is a New Order innovation, though organizations with a similar structure but much less influence had existed under Sukarno. While the absence of such an institutional framework has made Islam less susceptible to government control, it has also increased the likelihood that the "umat" will divide along regional and ideological fault lines.

Because of the way in which confessional lines determined allegiance to political parties in the so-called *aliran* system of the 1950s, membership in a Muslim party served to define one as a practicing Muslim. In a sense, voting for a Muslim party in 1955 was a widely accepted indication of one's piety. It is curious that the depth of one's commitment to a religion could be measured by such a secular mechanism as a national election. Even today, when mention is made of devout Muslims as a minority amidst a more lax majority, the usual reference point is the 1955 elections, the only free national elections Indonesia has ever had, where Muslim parties got approximately 40 percent of the vote. We have no other measure, and no way of indicating whether this relative percentage has changed in the last thirty years.

The "Umat" Today and the Decline of the Nahdatul Ulama

The old Islamic organizations-cum-political parties today have lost their monopoly on representation of Muslim interests, and the leading Muslim activists

of the 1980s are distinguished as much by their lack of organizational affiliation as by their identification with Muslims beyond Indonesia's borders. The expansion of the "umat" in Indonesia today can be explained by the same two factors that determined its contraction in earlier periods—changing local political and economic conditions, and a changing international Islamic environment. At the national level, the power of the central government has increased under the New Order, as tolerance for independent political organizations has decreased. The strength of rural Javanese landlords, mainstay of the Nahdatul Ulama, has declined as government economic institutions have made themselves felt at the village level, and as major cash crops such as sugar, tobacco, coffee, and pineapples are increasingly controlled by bureaucratic and military elites rather than by Muslim landlords. At the same time, changes in the international Islamic environment have made it increasingly possible for the state, rather than private Islamic organizations, to represent Islamic interests. Such changes have also resulted in the emergence of different models of the Islamic state, each competing for world recognition, and different centers of Islamic thought, each attracting adherents from around the globe. Mecca is still the holiest city of Islam but in terms of Islamic education, ideology, and political development, there are several aspiring "capitals" for the umat. A third important change in the international Islamic environment has been a shift in the class base of activist Islam from traditional conservative elites to the urban lower middle class.

The recent history of the Nahdatul Ulama demonstrates the effect of all of these changes. Founded in 1926 as the *wadah* for traditionalist Javanese Islam in opposition to Abduh-influenced Muslim reformism, NU had reached its zenith by the late 1960s. Throughout the Sukarno years, it had been an ally of the nationalist party, the PNI, and represented a more amenable form of organized Islam than the more outspoken Masjumi, a reformist party with great strength in the islands outside Java. In return for its willingness to support the government, NU gained control over both the Ministry of Religion and the vast and lucrative haj operations. It also secured a kind of "benign neglect" for the pesantren-based kyai who, as the party's senior authorities, would thus be free from government harassment. NU's active role in the crackdown and massacres of suspected Communists in 1965-66 had led it to expect more rewards from Sukarno's successor than it received, and its relatively strong showing in the 1971 election (18.9 percent of the vote) led some to conclude that its reputation as a party led by opportunists needed some revision.¹⁶

The results of the election and the campaign that preceded it need to be put in perspective, however, for NU's high profile during the campaign and its vote-getting ability did not represent a break with its cautious past. Any election was a chance to demonstrate the power of Islam, and if not as violent, perhaps, as 1971, the 1955 elections had been just as vocal and heated. In each case, the virulence of the campaign resulted not so much from specific grievances or from the desire to control parliamentary seats or even patronage sources, but from the determination to prove the strength of Islam and Islamic leaders in a government-sanctioned competition.

The grievances of the NU leadership were genuine, as was the bitterness caused by the patently manipulated results, but the willingness to engage in frequent and often harsh criticism of New Order policies that characterized

16. Ken Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study* (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 2, 1974).

the NU campaign in 1971 dissipated soon after the election. In 1973, the NU leadership agreed to follow Suharto's directive on party simplification and merge with three other parties to form the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, a move made more palatable by the fact that NU was by far the strongest element within the new party. Its three partners were Parmusi, Perti, and the PSII.

Parmusi (Parti Muslimin Indonesia) was the accommodationist rump of the old Masjumi party which had been banned in 1960 for its role in the regional separatist movements. When its leaders pressed for reinstitution of the party prior to the 1971 elections, the government agreed on the condition that none of the old Masjumi leaders hold official posts in the new party. An "acceptable" leadership was finally approved in 1968, and two years later, Jaelani or "Johni" Naro took control of the party in an internal but government-backed "coup." The result was that Parmusi no longer represented any readily identifiable constituency. Such Masjumi elder statesmen as Mohammed Natsir and Mohammed Roem, who still commanded widespread respect and affection, expressed contempt for Naro whom they and many others regarded as a government lackey. And the Muhammadiyah, a leading organizational member of the old Masjumi, specifically rejected Parmusi's claim to be the heir to their old party. Parmusi received 24 parliamentary seats in the 1971 election.

Perti (Persatuan Tarbiah Islamiyah) was a small Sumatra-based party, ideologically akin to NU, but even stricter than NU in its reliance on the Shafi'i school of orthodox Islamic law. Perti had received 24 seats in the 1971 election.

Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) was strongest in Central and West Java. It was the direct descendant of Sarekat Islam, the first mass-based nationalist organization. The leader of PSII was the son of the charismatic founder of Sarekat Islam, Cokroaminoto, but by 1973, the party was beset by a bitter split in the leadership to the point that, when the merger with the other parties was under discussion, it was difficult to determine who in fact represented PSII. In 1971, the party won ten seats in the national Parliament.

Their common Islamic base in no way smoothed over the differences in geographical attachment, doctrine, constituencies, or personal rivalries among the PPP partners, nor did the four *unsur* (elements) lose their individual identities when subsumed in the new party. An arrangement whereby in every subsequent election, each of the four was allotted a percentage of PPP seats based on their performance in the 1971 elections was one factor reinforcing their separateness. NU, with 61 percent of the seats, could thus always overrule the combined strength of the other three, a fact which Parmusi members particularly resented.

The leadership of PPP also reflected a careful effort to accommodate the interests of the different *unsur*, rather than appeal to the rank and file over *unsur* divisions. The head, *ketua umum*, of the party was Parmusi leader Johni Naro. Idham Chalid, *ketua umum* of NU, was PPP president, and Kyai Masykur of NU headed the party's executive council. Despite its ability to act collectively on legislative issues and provide enough of an independent opposition to appeal to critics of the government who were not devout Muslims, PPP was in fact a fragile coalition.

Its fragility was nowhere so clearly demonstrated as in the efforts to construct a candidate list for the 1982 elections which would take the interests of both Parmusi (now called MI to indicate it was no longer an independent party) and NU into account. After several fruitless meetings at which no

agreement was reached, Naro on October 27, 1981 took to the National Election Board a list from which were excluded most of the well-known NU activists and government critics, most notably Yusuf Hasyim and Saifuddin Zuhri. Not only were key NU people dropped, but Naro had unilaterally reallocated seats so that NU no longer held an absolute majority. With seven seats eliminated from NU's portion and given to MI, MI and the three smaller unsur combined now had one more seat than NU. The list was immediately accepted by Amir Machmud, chairman of the Board, and NU just as immediately cried foul and threatened to withdraw from PPP.

If, as many suspected, Naro was acting on instructions from above, what were the motives behind the manipulation? In the short run, it was a way, admittedly heavy-handed, of settling a seemingly irreconcilable dispute between MI and NU over names on the candidate list—a dispute that had reduced the already low credibility of the elections. At least with one list, any list, the election machinery could crank ahead; without one, it ground to a halt. At the same time, the move weakened PPP's credibility as a party representing both a unified umat and an independent opposition. It was the latter that more immediately concerned the government. The weakness would redound to the benefit of Golkar in 1982, particularly in Jakarta, by reducing the possibility of crossover votes for PPP by disenchanted urban voters who had given PPP a victory in the capital in 1977. The elimination of the most vocal, and, in government eyes, most obstreperous NU leaders was probably a short-term goal in itself.

There were longer-term objectives as well. Naro's action would inevitably intensify the MI-NU rivalry which would lead PPP to go the way of PDI, a party that had been destroyed by internal factionalism one year earlier. This would be consistent with the Suharto government's policy of muzzling all sources of independent political opinion without eliminating the semblance of parliamentary democracy. The president had specifically rejected the idea of a single-party system; what he wanted was a system where all three parties were supportive, obedient, and pliable. Neither PPP nor PDI had been willing to play the game properly despite the cooptation of key leaders. The destruction of the parties by decree would have cost the state legitimacy. Destruction through internal squabbling, carefully orchestrated, would reflect less on the government than on the party leadership.

Naro's backers also undoubtedly realized that the move would ultimately divide NU itself, with the accommodationist recipients of government largesse grudgingly accepting the *fait accompli* and the dispossessed activists clamoring for retaliation. NU, arguably the last mass-based organization in the country with political aspirations, was worrisome, all the more so because its refusal to conform to the New Order ideals of political behavior, so clearly demonstrated in 1971, still showed few signs of weakening. NU had staged a walk-out on a parliamentary debate over Pancasila education in 1978 and in a national conference in 1981, its kyai had explicitly refused to endorse Suharto for a third term or confer on him the title of "Father of Development." It had also protested as unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting civil servants from belonging to political parties. Such defiance was enough to target the organization for reprisal. An internal split within NU would greatly reduce the possibility of any united action from Indonesia's largest Muslim organization.

Government manipulation was only part of the reason for the disorder in NU, however. The preelection moves to discredit PPP and its major component could only have been successful if NU itself was already weak. And it was

symptomatic of the changes confronting the organization that, in 1981, NU had no national leaders with the will and authority to mobilize the rank and file. The two top positions in the organization were held by a singularly uncharismatic political novice, Kyai Ali Masyum, and a political hack close to the government, Idham Chalid. It was Kyai Masyum who held the more influential post in the NU's organizational structure.

NU is divided into two major bodies, the legislative council or *syuriyah* consisting of religious scholars or *kyai*, and the *tanfidziyah* or executive branch, consisting of politicians and religiously trained laymen who handle the day-to-day affairs. It is the head of the *syuriyah*, the *rais aam*, who wields ultimate authority, a recognition in theory of his outstanding personal qualities and his capacity to determine the legality of any issue according to Islamic law. The *syuriyah* has veto power over decisions made by the *tanfidziyah*.

In April 1980, the old *rais aam* died at the age of 95. This was Bisri Syamsuri, the *kyai* of Pesantren Denanyar in Jombang and the last of the original founders of NU. He was also the last of a Jombang dynasty that had produced the first two *rais aam*, Hasyim Asyari and Wahab Chasbullah, and the last person who could mobilize the organization nationally. His death came at a low point in NU fortunes--the Ministry of Religion had passed out of NU hands, "Golkarization" was rapidly depleting the ranks of educated NU members, pesantren enrollment was on the decline, and the head of all Sufi tarekat had just defected to Golkar, raising the spectre of thousands of his followers doing likewise.¹⁷ If ever a strong leader was needed, this was the time, yet the position of *rais aam* remained vacant for a year-and-a-half, an indication of the difficulty in finding a suitable successor.

There seemed to be no *kyai* who could fulfill the unwritten qualifications to lead NU, someone who appealed to both East and Central Java, directed an influential pesantren, commanded respect as a religious scholar, and was relatively uncorrupt. Ky. Machrus Ali of Kediri was popular but too close to Gudang Garam, the clove cigarette company, and reputed to be too fond of the good life. Ky. Asad of Situbondo was an East Javanese favorite son, but had no desire to take on a prominent position. After a long and fruitless search, a conference of leading *kyai* was called in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, in October 1981, specifically to choose a new *rais*. Largely through the efforts of the progressive wing of the party headed by Abdurrachman Wahid, a choice was finally

17. Since 1957, there has been a federation of "orthodox" tarekat orders in Indonesia, the Jamiyyah Ahli Thoriqoh Mu'tabarah (Association of Members of Respected Tarekat Orders). In 1975, Kyai Musta'in Romly of Jombang, son of one of Java's most respected Sufi teachers and son-in-law of the *rais aam* of the Nahdatul Ulama, Wahab Chasbullah, was elected chairman of that body, thus becoming the head of all Naqshbandi-Qadiriyyah orders in Indonesia. Kyai Musta'in, however, was wooed by influential members of the Suharto government and, in return for ten hectares of land and funds to improve his Islamic university in Jombang, Dar al-Ulum, he campaigned for Golkar in the 1977 elections. The blow to NU was especially great because of the tradition of absolute obedience of Sufi followers to their leader--which meant that thousands of Kyai Musta'in's followers also defected to Golkar. NU was forced in 1979 to change the name of the Sufi federation by adding "Nahdliyyin" on the end, meaning NU orders as opposed to those in Golkar. See Zam Dhofier, "The Pesantren Tradition" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1980), pp. 269-86.

made--Ky. Ali Masyum of Krapyak, the large and influential pesantren near Yogyakarta, known both for its Sufi tarekat and its innovative curriculum. Relatively young, not particularly well-known nationally, inexperienced politically, lacking any particular charismatic traits or oratorical ability, Ky. Ali was chosen because he was thought to be innovative and open-minded. He was the technocrat of kyai, someone who could lead NU in new directions along the lines of the development plan worked out at the party congress in Semarang in 1979.

If the new rais could not lead the "umat" because of inexperience and limited exposure, the tanfidziyah head, Idham Chalid, whose experience and exposure were second to none, was not about to lead the "umat" into active opposition or bite the hand that had fed him such delicacies as Kalimantan timber concessions. Idham had held his position in NU since 1956 and was reelected at the Semarang congress. The only other contender for the post in 1979 was Ahmad Syaichu, a hardline, popular, if arrogant, ex-speaker of Parliament, who was known as a sworn enemy of Suharto and a close friend of General Nasution. Syaichu had no chance. Not only were millions of rupiah channeled into the party by the government to bring pro-Idham supporters in from the provinces, but there were stories of Opsus (Special Operations) men putting pressure on delegates in hotel hallways to vote for Idham.¹⁸ He was duly reelected, and his men filled all but two of the key positions in the tanfidziyah. Anti-Idham forces were powerless to halt the pro-Idham steamroller, well-financed and government-backed as it was, and this, too, was an indication of change in the party. The independence and strength of NU had always lain not in Jakarta but in the provincial, pesantren-influenced areas of East and Central Java and Madura. This was partly due to the presence of the most influential kyai in these areas and also to the mass mobilization efforts of the later Sukarno years which depended on grassroots support. Under the New Order, NU, like all other political organizations, had grown much more centralized, much more dependent on Jakarta for financing, and hence much more vulnerable to manipulation from the center. The 1979 election of Idham was evidence of this trend, as to a lesser extent was the election of Ky. Ali Masyum in 1981, although the first case involved government interference and the second, orchestration from within the party itself. The key decisions were clearly being made in Jakarta, and dissatisfaction at the provincial level was muted.

The question of the candidate list highlighted these weaknesses of party leadership and the fissures within party ranks. The immediate public reaction of the NU leadership to the list presented by Naro in October 1981 was one of outrage, which took formal expression in a protest letter sent to the Election Board on November 6, following a full meeting of the NU officials (PBNU) at Ky. Masykur's house in Menteng on November 5. Even at this stage, many suspected Idham's complicity in the candidate list maneuvering. Not only was he known to have spoken with Naro and sent a list of his protégés to MI leaders before October 27, but the one thing that all of the dropped candidates had in common was their enmity toward Idham Chalid. Nevertheless Idham did sign the protest letter.

At the November 5 meeting, four options had been put forward and discussed by the party leadership. The first "minimalist" position was to have Idham

18. The same phenomenon had occurred in 1971 when Idham was elected *ketua umum* at the NU congress. See *Harian Abadi*, December 24 and 28, 1971; also *Harian Kami*, December 27, 1971.

and Ky. Masykur resign from their positions in PPP as a token protest; the second "minimalist plus" was to have them resign and, in addition, to require members of the government board of NU to choose between their NU positions and representing PPP; the third, "maximal minus" was to put pressure of an undisclosed nature directly on Naro; and the fourth "maximal" position was to withdraw from PPP entirely.

Option two was tentatively adopted, although no resignations were announced and no specific action taken. Over the next few months, as positions crystallized, four distinct groups emerged within NU. The first group included Idham Chalid and his associates. Probably involved in the original candidate list manipulation, Idham could gain nothing from resigning, nor from having NU withdraw from PPP in accordance with the second option. His position within the organization depended on his control of patronage from government sources, yet the flow of that patronage depended on his ability to "deliver" NU. Both he and the men around him--Nuddin Lubis, Chalid Mawardi, Zamroni, Ky. Anwar Musaddad, Ky. Ali Yafie, and others--survived because of their skill at maneuvering within the Jakarta elite, and none had large personal followings or geographically based constituencies. This group presented a threefold argument for remaining in PPP: first, without PPP, there would be no forum for channeling the political aspirations of the people; second, the party had always been involved in politics and did not have the experience or will to shift suddenly and devote itself wholly to social and educational activities; and, third, democracy would suffer a setback.

The second group were the "progressives"--Abdurrachman Wahid, Dr. Fahmi Saifuddin (a public health official and son of Saifuddin Zuhri), and Ky. Sahal Mahfudz and other kyai associated with a pesantren-based community development program run by a liberal Muslim social science research organization commonly referred to by its Indonesian acronym, LP3ES. Believing that traditional Islamic institutions were in danger of losing all relevance to modern Indonesia and that economic development was a widely accepted goal, founders of the LP3ES saw the pesantren as uniquely equipped to be the center of a community development effort because of the importance both of the kyai as a community leader and of the pesantren as an economic institution. They hoped to turn NU's rural base into a social movement resembling Muhammadiyah, and believed that, ultimately, it was more important for NU members to be managers of KUDs (rural cooperative societies) than representatives in Parliament. The "progressives," then, were on principle firmly committed to NU's withdrawal from politics and actually welcomed the Naro move as an excuse for getting out. They thought NU members should be released to choose whatever political party they wished, and, according to them, the only people who were determined to stay in PPP were those with formal positions in the government whose personal ambitions would be thwarted by an NU withdrawal. If such a withdrawal were actually to take place, the "progressives" argued, not only would the government cease to be suspicious of NU activities and NU civil servants, but the organization would most likely grow, just as it did when NU withdrew from Masjumi in 1952. Despite this determination to withdraw from PPP, however, the "progressives" tended to favor accommodation with the government, for they realized that government funds were ultimately the only available source for the kind of socioeconomic development program based on Islamic ideals which they espoused. Members of this group tended to be young and urban-based, also without any particular constituency.

Third were the leading kyai of the syuriyah, septo- and octogenarians, not particularly fond of Idham, but cautious of any major political move.

Their caution stemmed in part from age and experience, but also in part from the fact that, as important informal leaders in their home areas, they were beneficiaries, if not dispensers, of government patronage, and would be unwilling to jeopardize this status unless a clear emergency arose. They tended to counsel against withdrawing from PPP. "Withdrawal is an atom bomb," Ky. Machrus of Kediri noted, "and you don't use an atom bomb on a family squabble."¹⁹ The caution expressed by these kyai was consistent with their acknowledged role as a brake on headstrong politicians. It also may have reflected their sensitivity to provincial politics, where signs of displeasure in Jakarta could easily turn into repressive actions by local officials anxious to earn the approval of their superiors.

The final group were the provincial politicians who looked toward such outspoken opposition leaders as Yusuf Hasyim. They at once had the most to lose by NU's withdrawal from PPP and the best means at their disposal for fighting back. In the provinces, elective office was the reward for service to the organization; membership in the Parliament was a source of patronage and prestige and an avenue of social mobility. It was one thing for a national figure like Yusuf Haysim or Saifuddin Zuhri to be dropped from Naro's list; they remained national figures, and they had other occupations to which they could return. But a local politician dropped from the list lost the high visibility and glamor associated with a position in the capital, and the only other alternative was a much less satisfying position in the provincial or kabupaten DPR. Furthermore, the provincial politicians too had personal constituencies and clients who looked to them for favors and assistance; their local patronage role would be eliminated without an elective position. Given the stakes involved in the Naro manipulations, the local politicians wanted fast and immediate retaliatory action, and they were much better equipped to take it, in part because of their control over the rank and file. Jakarta's actions were limited by the realities of what a huge mass organization could hope to achieve, as the four options outlined at the November 5 meeting indicated. The organization, as an organization, could certainly demand that its top two leaders resign and expect the demand to be obeyed. It was quite another thing to order all candidates to withdraw from active candidacy, knowing that many would put personal aspirations above party interests. An instruction from the center to local leaders had little chance of success unless it conformed with the latter's own inclinations.

The difference in center-periphery interpretations of events was a long-standing division in NU. It had been the *daerah* which protested most vociferously against the Jakarta leadership's acceptance of Sukarno's NASAKOM (nationalism/religion/communism) formulation in the 1960s and against the merger with PPP in 1973. And this time, it was most vocal in its calls for the NU to withdraw from PPP (*after* the elections), to boycott the elections, and for firm disciplinary action to be taken against Naro. But these provincial politicians shared no real common interests with the other group that advocated withdrawal, the "progressives." The "progressives" wanted to get out of politics on principle; the local politicians wanted greater political independence. For the "progressives" withdrawing from PPP was an end in itself; for the politicians, it was a way of retaliating against Naro and undermining his claims to leadership.

Thus there were a number of cross-cutting divisions. On the issue of whether or not to withdraw from PPP, there was a tactical alliance between

19. Interview, January 1982.

the "progressives" and the local politicians. On whether or not to get out of politics, the center and the local politicians had more in common--both being determined to stay involved in formal party politics--while the "progressives" and rural kyai would each have been happier to get out. With regard to the priorities of the organization as a whole, the natural alliance was, on the one hand, between the kyai and the local politicians, both of whom had clear personal and geographical constituencies, and, on the other, between the "progressives" and the collaborationists at the center, both of whom from their respective perspectives saw the need for interaction with the government.

Traditionally, these divisions were surmounted symbolically in the person of the *rais aam*, someone with sufficient authority to appeal to kyai, Jakarta political hacks, and local politicians at once. In this case, the *rais aam* proved the weak link in the NU chain, and Ky. Ali wavered back and forth between the "progressives" and the Idham faction, eventually ending up as titular head of the anti-Idham bloc. PPP remained intact through the 1982 elections, with a slight drop in percentage of the vote from 1977. NU did not fare as well.

Shortly after the elections, the leading kyai met in Jakarta and demanded Idham's resignation. He agreed, only to retract his statement several weeks later, when he set up an alternative NU leadership composed of like-minded accommodationists.

But the elections were over, and Golkar had achieved its usual margin of victory. PPP was in precisely the position the government wanted, with most of the real opposition out of Parliament, and the legitimacy of the party, either as the voice of a united "umat" or as an independent opposition, virtually destroyed. Suharto had made his point about the undesirability of independent political organizations; but now he was faced with a division in NU that pitted the old pro-Idham group against all of the influential kyai of East Java. The division was symbolized by the scheduling of two meetings--one of the ulama, to be held December 18-21 at Situbondi, near Malang at Ky. Asad's *pesantren*, and one of the Idham group to be held in Jakarta on December 7-8.

The sites chosen for the meetings were telling. The choice of a *pesantren* for the first underscored both the desire of the NU leadership to "return NU to the *pesantren*" and their commitment to the principle that authority rested with the ulama, not with the laymen. But that was in some ways the least of the symbolism. No national conference of ulama had been held in a *pesantren* since Indonesian independence, in part because of the jealously guarded individualism and autonomy of the kyai. To meet in one *pesantren* would be to acknowledge the superiority of one kyai over another, and for over thirty years this had been studiously avoided. The meeting in Situbondo was thus a clear acknowledgment of Ky. Asad's leadership, and a snub to the ostensible *rais aam*, Ky. Ali Masyum.

With two such clearly defined camps, the government seemed to have three options: to side with Idham, to side with Ky. Asad, or to remain neutral. That it ultimately chose a fourth option says much about the current state of the "umat." That option was to try to unite both factions, but to have the newly unified organization also accept the primacy of Pancasila and thus the legitimacy of the regime.

Without the kyai, Idham was clearly of no use to the government. Having no personal constituency, he was no longer in a position to play the intermediary role he had thrived on for so many years. This was not to be a repeat of

the Parmusi coup in 1968 where the government backed Naro, the Idham Chalid of his party. With the PPP safely tamed, political leadership was not an issue. Idham could not claim to represent Islamic interests in any way, and it was Islamic support that Suharto was seeking.

At the same time, the link to PPP was important, if only to demonstrate to outsiders that organized Islam did indeed have representation in Jakarta. To have spurned the Jakarta politicians completely would have been to acknowledge the complete artificiality of the party and would have sanctified the separation of kyai from any government-orchestrated political processes. While Suharto, therefore, made clear his preference for the Asad faction by allowing the Situbondo meeting to take place and withholding a permit for the Jakarta meeting, the pressures to reconcile were apparent.

If the prime immediate issue at Situbondo was the fate of the party, and more particularly its leadership, the second most important issue to be discussed was *azas tunggal*, the recognition of Pancasila as the sole basis for all mass organizations, including those like NU, which had given Islam that honor in their charters.

The issue was a divisive one, with most conservative kyai and provincial politicians vociferously opposed to accepting *azas tunggal*, and the "progressives" in favor, presumably following the same principles that led them to support NU's withdrawal from PPP--that it was the only way to keep the organization above suspicion.

Ultimately, NU justified its acceptance of *azas tunggal* by the formula, as stated by Achmad Siddiq of Jember, that Pancasila was a *falsafah*, a philosophy created by human beings, whereas Islam was a revelation. There was therefore no question of the two competing with each other. But this was an interesting formulation, because to orthodox Muslims since the Mutazilite heresy of the ninth century, "falsafah" has always represented a threat to faith. In one of the many pamphlets he wrote for NU youth groups, Saifuddin Zuhri wrote that Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Hamilton, Comte, Darwin, Spencer, Marx, Nietzsche, and Einstein, who "called themselves progressive thinkers," were actually trying to use their philosophies to displace religion.²⁰ Calling Pancasila a philosophy may have been a calculated ploy to win over resistant kyai by ensuring that their formulation of acceptance could also be interpreted as contempt.

Whether or not the decision to accept *azas tunggal* turns out to have been a wise one, it does demonstrate the extent to which intellectuals (defined as anyone with a graduate degree--of whom there are a growing number) are influential in the organization. The respect accorded them has been clear since the 1950s, when, after a largely futile attempt to woo them into the organization, the NU tried to create its own intelligentsia through the IAIN, the state Islamic universities which until 1972 were controlled by NU. Thus far the influence of the intellectuals in NU has had mixed results. Ky. Ali Masyum's selection as *rais aam* clearly backfired, leading some to question the intellectuals' understanding of the rank and file. There is also some danger that under a more "modern," outward-looking leadership, there will be little to distinguish NU from other independent or state-sponsored Muslim organizations.

20. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Menghidupkan Nilai-nilai Ahlussunnah wal Jam'ah dalam Praktek* (Jakarta: Pucuk Pimpinan IPNU, 1976).

The Nahdatul Ulama in a Changing Community

One result of the combination of governmental manipulation and internal factionalism described above is that the political center of the Nahdatul Ulama has become divorced from its mass base, and this in turn has affected the organization's ability to define the limits of the "umat" for its members. The ability to provide that definition depended in part on the members' perception of NU as a national organization with a center in the capital, Jakarta. Indeed, one of the features of the aliran system, and one which made it particularly potent in the immediate postindependence period, was that Jakarta was the hub of each "stream," so that the terms of reference were the same for each and participation in the national political system an objective more or less shared by each. For the purposes of defining the "umat," that perceived role was crucial. Now with the Jakarta-based leadership in disarray and with no obvious overlap between the religious community and the most relevant political community, the nation, NU can no longer provide an all-encompassing framework within which members can order their lives. It cannot even represent all Javanese Muslims who follow the practices that have come to be associated with NU. The songs and chants of the various NU *ormas* or mass organizations today have a rather anachronistic ring--witness this example from the NU young women's association, Fatayat:

Ahlussunnah is the group, the Quran and hadith the guides,
Consensus (*ijma'*) and analogy (*qiyas*) together, these are the
ways of the *madhab*,
The friends Fatayat and Ansor, we are the leaders of the nation
We must be forthright, modest, examples for the rest,
We pray with the *ushalli*, read the *talqin* when we die,
After death the *tahlil*, all this is put into practice,
We open meetings with prayers, ask God for mercy,
Also to the one who intercedes, he who leads the entire *umat*,
The [NU] symbol is surrounded by a rope, nine stars shining,
The leaders of Fatayat know they must do good and prevent evil,
The stars of NU are four and five, the organization of NU is the
fortress of the state,
We submit to Allah, the all-powerful, he who guides mankind,
Our lord, our God, love us and guide us,
In our religion, our daily lives and in the next world.

The song implies that all those who read the *ushalli* and *talqin*²¹ are members of NU, but this is clearly no longer true, and, as the ranks of those who may be "NU in their hearts" but Golkar in their jobs and on their ballots increase, many are looking for membership in an Islamic community that extends beyond the confines of the organization. As a result, the "umat" is once again expanding.

21. *Ushalli* is the "short declaration of intent pronounced audibly or mentally immediately prior to prescribed religious ritual in which the performer states his intent to perform the act"; *talqin* is a "term used to denote an instruction given by a religious teacher and generally denoting instruction given to the deceased at graveside at the close of the burial service." Both are considered heretical innovations (*bid'a*) by reformist Muslims. Howard Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reformism in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), pp. 206, 210.

The relationship between the Nahdatul Ulama and the state has also affected the NU's ability to define the limits of the "umat." The last thirteen years have witnessed a major shift in control of both Islamic education and the haj from NU, which controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs until 1971, to the government. Curriculum in state and private Islamic schools is now regulated by three government ministries, Muslim teacher-training schools are run by the government, and transfer between the secular and Islamic school systems is possible through government equivalency exams. Scholarships to the Middle East, over which NU once had substantial influence, are now channeled through the Ministry of Religion. *Zakat fitrah*, which once went to private religious organizations including NU, is now collected by local councils set up by the Ministry, which also controls the haj, a major source of income. There is an increasing frequency of *haji dinas*, or pilgrims who made the haj at state expense, to reinforce Muslim credentials of key government officials, reward individuals for loyalty to the government, or even perhaps dilute the import of the title, "Haji" by enabling such peculiar pilgrims as Javanese *dalang* to acquire it.

Much of the state's ability to play a key role in Islamic affairs comes from its control over resources. But another major factor has been the growth of an international Islamic bureaucracy in which the state can only participate qua state: the Islamic Conference and the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference are two examples. Through its importance as an international economic actor and the influence of Saudi Arabia within it, OPEC, though not an Islamic organization, made identification with the Islamic world a matter of political expediency for members and buyers of OPEC oil alike. The existence of such international organizations has meant that contact between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia increasingly takes place between government officials, not members of private organizations as before. (Such contact is also a logical consequence of Mecca being a Saudi city rather than an autonomous political unit with its own ruler.)

The role of the state in propagating "official Islam" is acceptable to what seems to be an increasing number of urban professionals who see no particular conflict between Islam and government, who are more comfortable in Golkar than in the old Muslim organizations, and who are content to be pious within authorized limits. Simultaneous with the government's increasing role in Islamic affairs has been the increasing pressure it brings to bear on Muslim organizations, to weaken them institutionally, cajole or coerce their members into becoming inactive, or strengthen accommodationist elements within them. The developments within NU are a case in point.

As government civil servants of "nominal" Muslim background become increasingly involved in Islamic affairs, and as more members of the Indonesian "umat" are coopted or coerced into Golkar, no longer can identity as a pious Muslim be determined primarily by organizational affiliation. Leading kyai, who by birth, education, past political involvement, and philosophy are Nahdatul Ulama archetypes, now officially belong to Golkar, while leading officials of the PPP seem more devoted to the pursuit of official approval than the defense and propagation of Islam.

As their decreasing political significance has hastened the decline of the old national Muslim organizations, so has demographic change. A whole generation has now grown up with no direct knowledge of the process by which their parents could say "I am a member of NU [or Muhammadiyah, or Masjumi]; therefore, I am a Muslim." They were not members of the Muslim militia during the Revolution, fighting a jihad against the Dutch; nor were they told by

their kyai that it was forbidden (*haram*) to vote for anything but a Muslim party in a national election. The centers of Muslim thought in Indonesia today are not the organizations with a historical stake in the political process. They are small groups centered at schools, universities, and local mosques, often taking the form of Quranic study clubs. Precisely because they are not and cannot be mass organizations, their orientation is not limited by the geographic boundaries of the Indonesian state. Moreover, perhaps because organizational affiliation is no longer sufficient to establish Muslim identity, Indonesians are turning instead to external manifestations of personal piety--particularly, appropriate dress for women. Whether or not pious Muslim schoolgirls should be allowed to wear a headscarf as part of their school uniform, or to refuse to participate in sports where their arms and legs are revealed, are burning issues of debate in Jakarta. The "umat" is international for Indonesian Muslims today in a way it has not been for centuries. Ongoing processes--improvements in communication, migration to the Middle East, exchange visits of Iraqis and Bangladeshis, availability of Indonesian translations of the works of al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutub--have helped widen the "umat" that is most relevant to Javanese. There is a cross-fertilization currently taking place within Javanese Islam and between Javanese and their Muslim counterparts elsewhere. By focusing on the expansion and contraction of the community that gives meaning to Javanese Muslims, I have tried to break away from the image of Islam in Indonesia as something static. If a more dynamic view is taken, much of what appears to be the anomalies of Javanese Islam may turn out to have been only historical curiosities.